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1. Introduction
The higher education has become popular with economic
development in any advanced country. In Japan, the ratio of students who~ /
go on to high schools amounts to 95.8% and to universities and cplleges
49.1% in 1999, while they were 57.7% and 10.3% in 1965, respectively. (I)
Education has both aspects of investment and consumption (Arai
(1995), Blaug (1968». Then, the high ratios should be explained by the
high rate of return to education and / or the rising income of households.
Fig.1 describes the time pattern of the relation between an enrolment rate
for universities (and colleges) and an increasing rate of income (a worker's
income) from 1950s to 1990s in Japan. (2) We can see from the figure that
before 1975, there was a positive relation between them. However, after
1975, though the increasing rate of income was falling rapidly, the
enrolment rate kept the level of 38% and then rose. That is, once the ratio
of students who go on to universities rises, it won't fall easily, even though
(1) The data source is the report made public by the Ministry of Education.
(2) We use the worker's income per capita as the income. The data source is the Annual
Report of the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (Statistics Bureau,
Management and Coordination Agency).
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the rate of income growth decreases. This fact implies that the rising
enrolment rate cannot be explained only by the income factors. In this
paper, we attempt to construct a model which explains a formation of
demand for education, considering the individual preference for the
higher education (university). We assume that the individual preference
for education depends on the average level of education in a society and
changes discontinuously at some level of the social average. (3) That is, we
consider a possibility of existence of a critical social average level of
education where popularization of education can be accelerated very
strongly. (4)
We examine a model in which the individual preference is affected by
popularization of education, and show the optimal policies for the higher
education in dynamic setting. (6) The remainder of the paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 presents a model and section 3 formulates the
optimization problem and examines the optimal policies. Finally
concluding comments follow in section 5.
2. Model
2.1 An individual behavior
We consider an economy consisting of homogeneous individuals, who
form human capital through education. An individual human capital is
(3) Eckstein and Zilcha (1994) analyzed the optimal educational policies, considering the
difference in the parent's preference for children's education.
(4) Trow (1972) called wide diffusion of education popularization of education.
(5) Furumatsu and Shirai (2000) analyzed the optimal subsidies to university with
reference to education and research activities in dynamic setting.
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where h is the level of human capital, k the rate of embodying knowledge,
and H the amount of knowledge in a society. The rate of embodying is
assumed to depend on the level of education which individuals receive:
k =k(e), (2)
where e is the level of education. We assume that k (0) = 0, ke > 0, kee < 0,
where subscripts mean derivatives with respect to the corresponding
variables.
We assume that change in the amount of knowledge in a society
depends on the average level of human capital at the time. Assuming that
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knowledge depreciates at the rate 6 (0 < 6 < 1), we define the
accumulation function ofknowledge in a society as follows:
Ii = G (h ) - 6H, (3)
where Ii is the change in the stock of knowledge, Ii: the average level of
human capital in a society, and G' > o. (6)
We assume that a representative individual has a separable utility
function consisting of consumption and education:
U = u(c)+ov(e), (4)
where c is the amount of consumption. We assume that u' > 0, u" < 0,
Vi > 0, v" < 0 . The factor a presents the weight on utility of education. We
suppose that the weight changes with the amount of knowledge as
follows:
o(H) = Q
o(H) = a
for H < H*,
for H ~ H*,
(5)
(6)
where Q and a are given positive constant parameters, and Q < a. This
means that the weight factor jumps at H*. That is, H* is a critical point
which causes discontinuous change in an individual preference for
education. (7)
Assuming that the individual labor supply is proportional to
(6) Since we consider the representative individual, the average level of human capital in
the society is equal to the level of individual human capital.
(7) Futagami and Mino (1995) defined a point causing threshold externalities in the case
of public capital by the same form. See Azariadis and Drazen (1990) about threshold
externalities.
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individual human capital and that the proportional coefficient is unity,
the amount of labor supply is expressed by h in efficiency units. The
individual budget constraint is
wh - T == e + pe , (7)
where w is the wage rate, T the lump sum tax, and p the price of
education which the individual faces. The individual maximizing problem
is expressed as
max U == u(c) + a(H)v(e)
s.f. wh - T == e + pe
h == k(e)H.
The first order conditions are
u' - A == 0,
a(H)v' + A(wk'H - p) == 0,
wk (e)H - T == e + pe ,
(8)
(9)
(10)
where A is a Lagrangean multiplier. Solving the above equations, we
obtain the following demand functions:
e == e(w,T,p,H),
e == e(w,T,p,H).
Totally differentiating (8)-(10), we have
(11)
(12)
(
U" 0 - 1 ) (de)o av"+Awk'li wk'H -p de
- 1 wk'H - p 0 dA
Solving (13), we obtain("1
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Be ay"+>"wk"H
<0, (14)-
BT D
Be ->..(wk'H -p)+e(ay"+>"wk"H) (15)
Bp
-
D
Be >..wk'(wk'H - p) - wk(ay" + >..wk"H) (16)
aH D
Be -u"(wk'H -p) (17)-= <0
aT D '
Be - u"e(wk'H - p) - >.. (18)
-= <0
ap D '
Be u"wk(wk'H - p) - >"wk' (19)
BH - D
where D denotes the determinant ofthe coefficient matrix in the left hand
side of(13), i.e.,
D = - u"(wk'H - p)2 - (ay" + >"wk"H) > o.
2.2 Government behavior
The government imposes the income tax and spends the revenue on
the subsidy for education. Assuming that the cost of education is unity,
the educational subsidy is defined as (l - p)e (0 < p < 1). Through the
choice of 1 - p, the government can control the price of education which
individuals face. The government budget constraint is expressed as
T = (l-p)e.
(8) The weight factor a(H) is given positive constant parameter.
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3. Optimal Policies
We assume that the government has an intertemporal utilitarian
social welfare function defined by the utilities of the present and future
individuals. The government chooses T and p so as to maximize the social
welfare subject to the government budget, that is :
max fo"" (u(e) + a(H)v(e »e -pIdt
s.t. T = (l - p )e
if = G (it) - 6H,
where the constant p > 0 is a discount parameter. We define the current
value Hamiltonian Hh as
Hh == u(c) + a(H)v(e) + 'Y(T - (l - p)e) + T/(G (h) - 6H),
where '1 is a Lagrangean multiplier of the government budget and T/ the
costate variable. We obtain the first order conditions as follows:
I Be , Be ( Be ) "Be
u -+av -+'1 l-(l-p)- +T/GkH-=O
BT BT BT BT'
(21)
(22), Be I Be ( Be) "Beu - + av - + '1 - (l - p)-+ e + T/G k H - = 0,
Bp Bp Bp Bp
(
,Be I Be Be (, (, Be ) ))r, = - u -.- + av - - 'Y(l - p) - + T/ G k H - + k - 6 + T/P .
BH BH BH BH (23)
Using (7), we can rewrite (21) and (22) as follows, respectively:
,Be , I
-u +'Y-BT('Y(l-P)-T/GkH)=O,
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,8e , ,
- u e + 'Ye - - ('Y(l - p) - "IG k H) = O.
8p
From (24) and (25), we have
(
8e 8e) , ,8p -e 8T ('Y(l-p)-"IGkH)=O.
Using (17) and (18), (26) is rewritten as follows:
>. , ,
- D ('Y(l - p) - "IG k H) = O.
Since>. is not zero,
'Y(l- p) - "IG'k'H = 0,
or
I-p ='1 G'k'H.
'Y
The optimal level of educational subsidy is determined from (29).
Substituting (28) to (24), we have
u' = 'Y.
Using (7), (28) and (~, we rewrite (:?3) as follows:
iJ = - 'Ywk - "I(G'k - 8) + "Ip.
(25)
(26)
177)
(28)
(29)
(~
(31)
We can investigate the optimal policies, using (3) and (31).
To simplify analyses, we specify the human capital formation
function, the knowledge accumulation function and the individual utility
. --f3
function as h = aeH, H = gh - 8H, U = c + a(H)v (e), respectively. The
constant values a, g and f3 are parametrically specified and positive, and
o< f3 < 1. The individual maximizing problem is revised as follows:
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max U = c + a{H)v(e)
s.l. wh - T = c +pe
h =aeH
The first order conditions are
1 - >. = 0,
trV' + >.(waH - p) = 0,
waeH - T = c +pe .
The demand functions are
c = c(w, T,p,H),
e = e(w, T,p,H).
From (32)-(36), we have
oc trV"
-=-<0
oT D '
oc· 1( "
op = - D waH -p -trV e),
& 1 "oH = - D (-wa(waH -p)+av wae),
oe _ 0
oT - ,
oe 1
-=--<0
op D '
oe wa
-=->0
oH D '
where D = - trv" > o.
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The government problem is to choose T and p so as to maximize the
social welfare subject to the budget as follows:
max Jo
oo (c + Ot(H)v(e ))e -pIdt
S.t. T = (l - p )e
. -f3
H = gh -8H.
The first order conditions are
ac , ae ( ae ) f3 f3 f3 1 ae
- + OtV - + 'Y 1 - (l - p ) - + TJ(3ga H e - - = 0
aT aT aT aT '
(43)
iI = - (~+ av'~ - 'Y(I - p)~+ 17({3gaPHPeP-l~+ (3ga PePH P- 1 - 0)) +17p. (45)
8H 8H 8H 8H
Eqs. (43) and (44) are rewritten as follows, respectively:
I f3 f3 1 f3 ae(waH-p+Otv -'Y(l-p)+TJ(3ga e -H )-+'Y-1=O,
aT
, f3 f3 1 f3 ae(waH -p +OtV -'Y(l-p)+TJ(3ga e - H )-+'Ye -e = O.
ap
From (4<», (41), (46) and (4.7), we can obtain
'Y = 1,
I-p = TJ(3ga f3ef3- 1H f3 .
Moreover, (45) is rewritten as follows:
i] = - wae - TJ(3g(ae)f3Hf3- 1 + TJ8 + TJp·
(4.7)
(50)
We describe two curves of Ii = 0 and i] = 0 on the (H, TJ)
(
l/(P-l) )
the curve Ii = 0 is vertical at {o/(gaPe P)} ,0.
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A = g (aeH/ - 8H. Partially differentiating with respect to H on Ji = 0,
we have
8A l(H 8e 1 - (3)8H = (3ga{Je{JH{J- -; 8H - -(3- . (51)
If (H /e)(8e/8H) < (1- (3)/(3, then the sign of (51) is negative. We assume
that (H/e)(8e/8H) «1-(3)/(3. Second, for the curve r,=0, totally
differentiating - wae - .,.,(3g (ae){J H{J-l +.,.,0 +.,., = 0, we have
(52)
In the positive quadrant in (H,.,.,) plane, the denominator of the right
hand side in (52) is negative by (~ along the curve r, = 0. However, the
numerator can take either sign. Therefore, the sign of (52) is indeterminate.
In either case, this curve is discontinuous at H * . (9) We denote
n = - wae - .,.,(3 g (ae / H (J-l + .,.,8 + .,.,p. Partially differentiating with respect
to.,." we have
(53)
Since we concentrate on the case of.,., > 0, the sign of (53) is positive.
In Fig.2 and Fig.3, as an example, we describe a case of
(J lj({J-l)
H* < {8/ (ga e{J)} . Fig.2 represents the case where the sign of (52) is
positive. That is, the curve r, = °is increasing with H and jumps at H * .
This means that the educational subsidy increases discontinuously. In
this case, as shown in Fig.2, there is an optimal convergent path to the
(9) The weight parameter a(H) changes from Q: to a at H'. It causes sudden increase of
demand for education. Then, to satisfy - wae -11{3g (ae)p HP-l + 110 + 11 = 0, the curve
11 = 0 should shift up at H'
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steady state. Fig.3 represents the case where the sign of (52) is negative.
That is, the curve r, = 0 is decreasing with H and jumps at H*. Also in this
case, there is an optimal path like Fig.3.
4. Concluding Comments
We have analyzed the optimal educational policies in dynamic
setting. In our setting, the government subsidizes the higher education,
because individual human capital formed through education contributes
to creation of knowledge in a society. Though knowledge also contributes
to formation of individual human capital, individuals do not take account
ofthese effects when they decide on their level of education.
Furthermore, in our model, the individual decision for the level of
education is affected by the preference for education. Under this setting,
we have analyzed the phenomenon of popularization of education, which
means the sudden increases in demand for the higher education by
change of preference. We have found the optimal convergent path to the
steady state, which jumps at the time when the individual preference
changes, that is, at the beginning of popularization. We conclude that the
government should substantially raise the subsidy for education at the
time. The intuitive reason is that the price effect of education is reduced
when the preference parameter for education shifts up, and the
government needs to give the larger subsidy to change the level of
education of individuals.
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Popularization in the Higher Education
and Optimal Educational Policies
Noriko Furumatsu
In this paper, we construct a model which explains a change in
demand for education, considering an individual preference for the higher
education (university). We suppose that the individual preference for
education depends on the average level of education in a society and
changes drastically at some level. We consider a possibility that diffusion
ofeducation brings about discontinuous increase in demand for education,
and examine the optimal educational policies in dynamic setting.
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